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I. INTRODUCTION
In July of 2014, Manuel Noriega—the infamous drug-trafficker, arms dealer,
and deposed military dictator of Panama1—filed a lawsuit in California state
court against the video game publisher Activision. His complaint alleged that
Activision had violated his “right of publicity” under California law by
publishing Call of Duty: Black Ops II, a popular video game.2 Black Ops II
features a character named Manuel Noriega who bears the real Noriega’s
likeness and is depicted as a brutal murderer. 3 According to Noriega, this use
of his persona constituted “ ‘blatant misuse, unlawful exploitation and
misappropriation of plaintiff’s image and likeness for economic gain.’ ”4
In October 2014, a judge for the Superior Court of California in the County
of Los Angeles dismissed Noriega’s suit under California’s anti-SLAPP suit
statute.5 According to the court, Black Ops constituted a “transformative
work”—meaning Noriega’s likeness was but one small piece of a broader,
expressive original creation—and was therefore shielded by the First
Amendment from a right of publicity suit.6 Thus, Activision’s free speech
rights trumped Noriega’s publicity rights.7
Though this result is undoubtedly correct, the court’s logic—while
accurately reflecting the state of the law—is troubling. Activision was permitted
to use Noriega’s likeness primarily because his character played a minor, fanciful
role in a sprawling, imaginative work of fiction.8 In this situation, the
“transformative work” test constituted a sufficient First Amendment buffer. It
is disturbingly easy, however, to imagine a similar situation with a dramatically
See generally JOHN DINGES, OUR MAN IN PANAMA: HOW GENERAL NORIEGA USED THE
UNITED STATES-AND MADE MILLIONS IN DRUGS AND ARMS (1990); Simon Hooper, The rise and fall
of Noriega, Central America’s strongman, CNN (July 7, 2010, 10:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/
WORLD/americas/07/07/panama.manuel.noriega.profile/; Seymour M. Hersh, Panama Strongman
Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms and Illicit Money, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/
1986/06/12/world/panama-strongman-said-to-trade-in-drugs-arms-and-illicit-money.html.
2 Complaint for Damages at 4, Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 2014 WL 3G11852 CC21
Super. Ct. 2014 (No. BC 551747).
3 Eugene Volokh, Can Manuel Noriega really win his “right of publicity” lawsuit against Activision?,
WASH. POST (July 17, 2014), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspirac
y/wp/2014/07/17/can-manuel-noriega-really-win-his-right-of-publicity-lawsuit-against-activision/.
4 Complaint for Damages at 4, Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 2014 WL 3G11852 (C21
Super. Ct. 2014) (No. BC 551747).
5 Order on Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike at 6, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc.,
2014 WL 5930149 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014).
6 Id. at *5. The nature of the “transformative work” test is discussed at note 63 infra and
accompanying text.
7 Order of Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike at 6, Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc.,
2014 WL 5930149 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2014).
8 Id. at *5.
1
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different outcome. Noriega’s right of publicity suit was—it seems obvious—an
intentional infliction of emotional distress suit in disguise. The former dictator
was clearly agitated by his portrayal as a madman, not by his portrayal per se.
His suit failed because his character appeared on screen so briefly. However,
this reasoning leaves in question the outcome if the game’s creators had used
Black Ops II to criticize and mock Noriega more thoroughly and included him as
a central character. Under those circumstances, the “transformative work” test
would have offered no shield; indeed, Noriega may well have won his lawsuit.
Part II of this Article presents an overview of the history of right of
publicity claims, explaining how they grew out of, and ultimately detached from,
the right of privacy. Part III will explore the unnerving emergence of a new
breed of right to publicity lawsuits: those designed to censor criticism of, and
commentary upon, a public official or public figure. This Part will then
describe why recent right to publicity rulings fail to protect artists, especially
video game makers, from lawsuits designed to suppress political speech. Part
IV proposes a new legal test to help guard expressive works—especially video
games—against such suits, even when the works themselves are not legally
“transformative.” Finally, Part V explains how the proposed test promotes
principles and values that lie at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection
of speech.
Although this proposed test is novel, its underpinnings are not. The
Supreme Court has previously encountered the conundrum of a tort that, while
neutral on its face, allows public figures to make an end run around the First
Amendment. In response, it has imported First Amendment jurisprudence into
tort law to stymie ingenious attempts by public figures to silence their critics.9
Courts should perform a similar analysis when faced with a right of publicity
suit that seems designed to curb free speech. This analysis becomes especially
important when a publicity suit targets a video game. The fact that video games
have emerged as a favored target of such suits suggests that the very thing that
makes video games so revolutionarily expressive—their ability to realistically
depict interactive, fictional worlds—also puts them at a heightened risk of
censorship under the guise of lawsuits.
II. THE MODERN RISE OF PUBLICITY RIGHTS
The right of publicity is thoroughly modern in every sense of the word. Its
philosophical and legal foundations would have been utterly foreign to the
founding generation, who had no conception of fame as a commercial asset to
be monetized. In fact, the Founders seem to have viewed their own fame as “a
9

See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
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kind of common republican property,” to be deployed as a means of promoting
“independence and nation building.”10 Fame for the Founders was not “an
instrumental good,” but rather a “ ‘final’ good,” valued “for its own sake” as a
reward for “disinterested civic virtue.”11
This view of fame was also held by most Americans in the century following
the founding. As the civic fame of the Founders broadened into less highminded realms, a vibrant celebrity culture flourished among authors and
performers.12 Although these celebrities’ likenesses were often exploited for
commercial gain—the names and faces of popular figures adorned a wide array
of products, from toys and bicycles to furniture and cigars—no corresponding
“right of publicity” emerged.13 The notion of fame as a “species of common
property” persisted, even as commercial exploitation skyrocketed.14
However, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, these
“unspoken assumption[s]” about one’s right to one’s own image shifted
As photography and printing technology grew more
dramatically.15
sophisticated, pictorial advertisements exploded, and famous people began to
attempt to assert commercial control over their likenesses.16 Predictably, most
courts rejected these early suits; still, a few prescient courts recognized an
individual’s proprietary interest in his own identity.17
A very different theory of publicity rights took center stage, however, as a
result of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s seminal 1890 article proposing
the existence of a right to privacy.18 Warren and Brandeis intended the right to
protect primarily against journalistic intrusiveness and seem not to have
intended their privacy doctrine to extend to an explicitly proprietary conception

10 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF.
L. REV. 127, 150 (1993); see also DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 33
(Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974); William Michael Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare
War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 736 (1997).
11 Madow, supra note 10, at 151.
12 See Amy Henderson, From Barnum to “Bling”: The Changing Face of Celebrity Culture, 7
HEDGEHOG REV. 37, 38 (2005).
13 Madow, supra note 10, at 152.
14 Neil Harris, Who Owns Our Myths? Heroism and Copyright in an Age of Mass Culture, 52 SOC. RES.
241, 251 (1985).
15 Madow, supra note 10, at 152.
16 Id. at 154; see also Samantha Barbas, From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of Appropriation in the Age
of Mass Consumption, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1119, 1131–32, 1142–45 (2013).
17 See, e.g., Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907) (indicating that “the
peculiar cast of one’s features is . . . also one’s property” and that “its pecuniary value . . . belong[s]
to its owner, rather than to the person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it”).
18 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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of one’s identity.19 Yet the first legislature to enshrine a right to privacy in
statute, New York, turned the concept into an early right of publicity, creating
criminal and civil liability for the unauthorized use of the “ ‘name, portrait or
picture’ ” of any living person for “ ‘advertising purposes, or for the purposes
of trade.’ ”20 Similarly, the first state supreme court to find a common law right
to privacy21 interpreted this right as a publicity right one that forbade the
unauthorized use of a person’s picture in advertising.22
These early successes, however, turned out to be outliers. Most legislatures
that codified a right to privacy23—as well as most courts that developed the
right into common law24—required plaintiffs who alleged a violation to prove
embarrassment or emotional distress. But a movie star who sees her face on an
unauthorized advertisement could hardly claim to be emotionally disturbed, and
so courts generally rejected the idea of a right of publicity that grew out of
generalized privacy rights.25 Under one especially popular theory, celebrities
waived any rights of publicity when they achieved a significant measure of
fame.26 In one case, the court rejected the publicity rights claim of a famous
college football player whose image had been used in advertising, without
permission, by a beer company.27 “[T]he publicity he got,” the court wrote of
the player, “was only that which he had been constantly seeking and
receiving.”28 In another case, an actress sued a burlesque theater for placing her
photograph at its entrance, despite the fact that the actress did not, and had
never, appeared in any burlesque shows.29 The court ruled against the actress,

19 See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1821 (2010);
Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for A Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 296 (1983).
20 Frederick R. Kessler, A Common Law for the Statutory Era: The Right of Publicity and New York’s
Right of Privacy Statute, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 951, 952 (1986). This law was passed in response to
a much-maligned appeals court decision holding that New York State had no common law right
to privacy. Id. at 958–61. The case involved a flour company that had used a minor’s picture—
without her authorization—to sell flour. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442,
447 (N.Y. 1902).
21 See Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the Right
to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 642 (2002).
22 See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 79–81 (Ga. 1905).
23 See. e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 2315 (2011); N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS CODE §§ 50–51
(2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
24 See, e.g., Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 164 N.E.2d 853 (N.Y. 1959).
25 See, e.g., Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y. 1952).
26 See O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
27 Id..
28 Id. at 170.
29 Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (W.D. Okla. 1938).
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finding that, by appearing in films, she had entirely surrendered her right to
privacy.30
Other courts developed a slightly more nuanced interpretation of publicity
rights, holding that only offensive or defamatory misappropriation of celebrity
likenesses was actionable.31 And some courts that jettisoned the offensiveness
requirement in establishing a cause of action still preserved it when establishing
damages.32 In one high-profile case, Zelma Cason sued the author Marjorie
Kinnan Rawlings for invasion of privacy after Rawlings’s autobiography
described Cason, using her real forename, as “an ageless spinster resembling an
angry and efficient canary.”33 The Florida Supreme Court—confronting the
right of privacy issue for the first time—held that though Cason had sufficiently
established a cause of action, she could not collect damages because “[t]here
was no mental anguish—no loss of friends or respect in the community—no
injury to character or reputation.”34 Tellingly, Cason’s suit had originally
included a libel claim, which the court threw out.35
The Second Circuit’s decision in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc.,36 however, brought a sea of change in the courts’ conceptualization of
privacy rights and the right of publicity. Haelan Laboratories involved a chewing
gum manufacturer (Haelan) that contracted with a famous baseball player to
obtain the exclusive right to use his photographs in advertisements.37 Soon
after, another chewing gum company (Topps) used the same player’s
photographs to sell its own product.38 Haelan sued Topps for violating the
right to publicity that it had contractually obtained from the baseball player.39
Haelan Laboratories presented a thorny legal issue. Because only individuals
can hold privacy rights, Haelan could not argue its case under a privacy-based
theory of the right to publicity. Instead, Haelan argued that the right to
publicity is a separate right, related to but not dependent upon privacy, which
was fundamentally property-based—and could thus be transferred.40 In a
groundbreaking opinion by Judge Jerome Frank, the court agreed, introducing

Id. at 1007.
See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953).
32 Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 253 (Fla. 1944).
33 Id. at 245.
34 Cason v. Baskin, 30 So.2d 635, 640 (Fla. 1947).
35 Cason, 20 So. 2d at 253.
36 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
37 Id. at 867.
38 Id.
39 See id. (“The plaintiff maintains that defendant invaded plaintiff’s exclusive right to use the
photographs of leading baseball-players.”).
40 Id.
30
31
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the phrase “right of publicity” into the legal lexicon for the first time.41 Each of
us, Judge Frank wrote, holds a publicity value in our own likeness, and that
value can undoubtedly be licensed or assigned to a third party. Intriguingly,
Judge Frank apparently felt compelled to push back against the offensiveness
requirement already in use in several states, writing: “it is common knowledge
that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers,
magazines, busses, trains and subways.”42
Accordingly, the court held that a right to publicity exists “in addition to and
independent of” the right of privacy, and that famous people have “a right in
the publicity value of [their] photograph[s].”43 Judge Frank did not attempt to
prove that this right was firmly entrenched at common law. Instead, he simply
asserted that such a right must exist, for celebrities would otherwise have few
legal means by which to control the use of their likeness—and reap the financial
gain that comes with such use.44
One year after Haelan Laboratories, Melville Nimmer wrote a widely read
article45—pitched as something of a sequel to Warren and Brandeis’s
disquisition46—proposing that courts should recognize a broad right to
publicity.47 Nimmer interpreted Haelan Laboratories as a “culmination” of a
growing trend in the courts toward erecting legal protections for individuals’
“publicity values,”48 encouraging other courts to adopt Judge Frank’s vision of
an independent right of publicity.49 Then, in 1960, William Prosser wrote an
influential article including “misappropriation”—his term for publicity rights—
as one of his four privacy-based torts, adding that the right primarily protects

41 Id. at 868; see Martin H. Redish & Kelsey B. Shust, The Right of Publicity and the First
Amendment in the Modern Age of Commercial Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443, 1453–54 (2015).
Judge Frank, however, shrugged off the “immaterial” question of whether publicity rights qualify
as property rights, writing that “the tag ‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a
claim which has pecuniary worth.” Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868. In spite of this dismissive
dicta, his entire opinion seems to be premised on the notion that the right of publicity is, in fact, a
property right.
42 Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
46 See id. at 203–04, 223.
47 Id. at 216.
48 Id. at 204.
49 See id. at 222–23 (describing Haelan Laboratories decision as “persuasive” and “a major step in
the inexorable process of reconciling law and contemporary problems”).
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“property” interests.50 When Prosser later served as the Chief Reporter of the
Second Restatement of Torts, he codified “misappropriation” in the
Restatement, more explicitly describing the protected right as “in the nature of a
property right.”51
The same year that the Second Restatement was released, the Supreme
Court held in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.52 that the general
principle of publicity rights passed First Amendment scrutiny.53 Following
Zacchini, as an increasing number of courts accepted Prosser’s conception of
misappropriation54—and an increasing number of legislatures passed laws
codifying this right into statute55—the right to publicity gained widespread
acceptance throughout the country.56

50 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 401–07 (1960). According to Prosser, the
three other torts comprising the law of privacy are intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of
private facts, and false light. Id. at 389. Some commentators believe that Prosser may have
considered misappropriation to be less tethered to the right of privacy than the other three torts.
See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 191, 193 (1983).
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977).
52 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
53 Zacchini involved an entertainer whose fame lay in his “human cannonball” act, which lasted
only about fifteen seconds. Id. at 563. A reporter filmed the entirety of Zacchini’s act and sold
the footage to a broadcasting company, which aired it on television. Id. at 564. Zacchini sued,
claiming that the broadcasting company had violated his publicity rights by televising the entirety
of his signature act. Id. A majority of the Supreme Court agreed, focusing on the fact that, by
disseminating footage of Zacchini’s act to the public, the broadcasting company had reduced
Zacchini’s economic incentive to perform the act in the future. Id. at 576. Thus, the Court
seemed to conceptualize the right of publicity as a fundamentally proprietary one. In a vigorous
dissent, Justice Powell argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments should have barred
Zacchini’s suit. Id. at 579–82 (Powell, J., dissenting). Zacchini, then, shows that the right of
publicity does not inherently violate the First Amendment. However, it should be noted that the
judgment in Zacchini was exceedingly narrow, focusing only on instances in which a performer’s
entire act was broadcast without the performer’s authorization. See id. at 576.
54 See, e.g., Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994); Felsher v. Univ.
of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 593 (Ind. 2001); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231,
236 (Minn. 1998).
55 See Robert M. Connallon, Comment, An Integrative Alternative for America’s Privacy Torts, 38
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 71, 79 (2007) (collecting statutes).
56 See Alicia M. Hunt, Everyone Wants to Be A Star: Extensive Publicity Rights for Noncelebrities Unduly
Restrict Commercial Speech, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1605, 1615 (2001); Eleanor Johnson, Note, Henley v.
Dillard Department Stores: Don Loves His Henley, and Has A Right to It Too, 45 VILL. L. REV. 169,
180–81 (2000).
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III. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S EMERGING THREAT TO CRITICAL SPEECH
Over two dozen states currently recognize some form of the right of
publicity—some by statute, some by common law, some by both.57 California
protects publicity rights through both common law and statute.58 The basic
components of this right are somewhat similar in every state, though they
occasionally vary in significant ways.59 California’s statutory right of publicity
contains these fundamental elements:
Any person who knowingly uses another’s name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling,
or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or
services, without such person’s prior consent . . . shall be liable
for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a
result thereof.60
Recognizing the dangers that an overly broad right of publicity could pose
to the First Amendment, various courts have struggled to create a test that
balances publicity interests with free speech rights. These tests fall into roughly

57 See Laura Hock, Note, What’s in a Name? Fred Goldman’s Quest to Acquire O.J. Simpson’s Right of
Publicity and the Suit’s Implications for Celebrities, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 347, 355 n.43 (2008).
58 Timed Out, LLC v. Youabian, Inc., 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 776 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001)).
59 Leaving aside free speech issues, there are two main areas in which right of publicity laws
usually differ. The first is inheritability—i.e., should an individual’s right of publicity be
transmissible to one’s heirs? See Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am.
Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231,
1235 (N.D. Ohio 1983). The second is the breadth of the right—i.e., how much of an
individual’s persona can be used before the right of publicity is triggered? See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc.,
447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1978). Although the inheritability question divided states
for several decades, most states today recognize publicity rights as inheritable. See, e.g., Bell v.
Foster, 2013 WL 6229174, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga. 2013); In re Estate of Reynolds, 235 Ariz. 80, 84
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). That is because the right has come to be seen as proprietary (and thus
transmissible) rather than moral (and thus individualized). See Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing
Group, LLC, 572 F. 3d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir. 2009); Bell v. Foster, 2013 WL 6229174, at *6 (N.D.
Ga. 2013); Reynolds, 235 Ariz. at 83. There is not yet a consensus, however, as to how broad the
right should be. Compare Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that
New York’s right of publicity law to a literal “portrait” or “picture” and does not encompass a
general likeness), and Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that Michigan’s right of publicity law includes an extremely broad definition of
“likeness” that includes a famous person’s catchphrases).
60 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (amended 1985).
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five categories. The first, which might be called the CBC test,61 asks whether
the defendant’s likeness has been used explicitly to sell a product; if it has, the
right of publicity claim may proceed. The second, which might be called the
core speech test, asks whether the defendant’s likeness has been used in news,
entertainment, creative works, or political contexts; if it has, the right of
publicity claim must fail.62 Although these tests are commendably protective of
speech, neither has gained much currency in recent years.
The third test, commonly called the “transformative work” test, asks
whether a work uses the plaintiff’s likeness as merely one piece of a much
broader work; if it does, the right of publicity claim must fail.63 The fourth test,
the “transformative use” test, asks whether the celebrity’s likeness itself has been
distorted or altered; if it has not, the right of publicity claim may proceed.64
The fifth and final test, the “predominant use” test, asks whether the use of
the defendant’s likeness has a predominantly expressive purpose.65 If not, and
the purpose is predominantly commercial, the right of publicity claim may
proceed.66 This test allows strikingly little breathing room for freedom of

61 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818
(8th Cir. 2007). In C.B.C., the Eighth Circuit held that online fantasy baseball products’ use of
baseball players’ names and statistics may violate those players’ common law right of publicity.
See id. at 822–23. However, the court decided that the First Amendment barred these players
from bringing suit because the information resided in the public domain. Id. at 823. The court
rejected the notion that, because the players’ information was used by an entertainment company
seeking a profit, the fantasy baseball website’s First Amendment interests were diminished. Id.
Accordingly, under the C.B.C. ruling, the Eighth Circuit now permits right of publicity claims
only against defendants who used a person’s likeness for explicitly—and exclusively—commercial
purposes, as in advertising. See id. at 824.
62 See Hart v. Elect. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2013); World Wrestling Fed’n
Entm’t Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 426 (W.D. Pa. 2003); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
63 See Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2013); Bosley v.
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (N.D. Ohio 2004); World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. v.
Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 426 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
64 See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1273–76
(9th Cir. 2013).
65 See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
66 See id. at 369. TCI is arguably another instance of a famous person using a right of publicity
lawsuit in order to circumvent the First Amendment concerns that would be present in a false
light or intentional infliction of emotional distress suit. The case involved Tony Twist, a
professional hockey player who sued Todd McFarlane for including a murderous character
named Anthony “Tony Twist” Twistelli in his comic book Spawn. Tony Twist and Twistelli bore
no physical resemblance—their only analogue was their “tough guy persona”—and Spawn was
undoubtedly an expressive work. Id. at 366. Still, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment did not bar Twist’s right of publicity suit against McFarlane. Id. at 374.
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expression and has been rejected by most courts that have had occasion to
consider it.67
In recent years, courts have generally relied upon the third or fourth tests—
transformative work or transformative use—when dealing with right of
publicity in video game lawsuits.68 The transformative use test in particular has
risen to prominence in a number of jurisdictions, though this test significantly
cramps expression and has led to some questionable results. In one case, a
California court allowed members of the band No Doubt to sue Activision for
including lifelike avatars in one of its video games—despite the fact that the No
Doubt avatars constituted a tiny fraction of the many characters from which
viewers could choose.69 In another case, the California Supreme Court held
that an artist’s creation and sale of t-shirts and prints featuring charcoal
renderings of the Three Stooges had no First Amendment protections against a
right of publicity suit.70 And in two prominent cases, the Third and Ninth
Circuits used versions of the test to hold that former NCAA college football
players could sue Electronic Arts for including their avatars in a video game that
featured hundreds of other avatars.71
The NCAA and No Doubt cases are particularly troubling because they
suggest that one of video games’ chief virtues—their ability to closely replicate
reality in a digital medium—also opens them up to legal liability. Had
Activision produced a movie featuring a scene at a No Doubt concert (and
depicted the band through lookalikes), it probably would have been immune
from a suit. Likewise, had Electronic Arts produced a graphic novel with a
chapter set at a college football game, with illustrated players clearly modeled
after real-world athletes, the First Amendment would likely have shielded it
from suit. But because these companies produced video games with

67 Michael Feinberg, Comment, A Collision Course Between the Right of Publicity and the First
Amendment: The Third and Ninth Circuit Find EA Sports’s NCAA Football Video Games Infringe Former
Student-Athletes Right of Publicity, 11 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 175, 195 (2014); Redish & Shust, supra
note 41, at 1476.
68 See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271
(9th Cir. 2013) (transformative use); Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 164
(transformative use); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 400 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011) (transformative use); Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 616 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006) (transformative work).
69 See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 400–01 (2011).
70 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
71 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1273–76
(9th Cir. 2013); Hart v. Electronic Arts, 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). The avatars did not bear the
players’ actual names or their true hometowns. In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1271. They did,
however, bear the players’ jersey number and physical characteristics. Id. at 1271–72; Hart, 717
F.3d at 146.
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meticulously rendered, lifelike details, they found themselves open to right of
publicity lawsuits.
Legally speaking, there is no clear reason why the right of publicity should
apply more vigorously to realistic, lifelike representations than it does to less
realistic, approximate representations where both representations are a part of
an expressive work. And images constitute only one aspect of the law; in
California, even the use of a famous person’s name may be enough to trigger a
right to publicity claim.72 Yet video games have recently emerged as a prime
target for right of publicity suits. One reason for this trend may be that, until
the Supreme Court’s 2011 ruling in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,73
the First Amendment protections granted to video games were unclear.74 But it
appears more likely that, because they may replicate a famous person’s likeness
so precisely, video games seem, to many plaintiffs, like a more aggressive and
intrusive offense against their right to publicity.
The inroads on protection of expression resulting from these lower court
rulings threaten to lay the groundwork for the use of publicity rights to silence
criticism. Under a transformative use test, Manuel Noriega’s suit against
Activision would have almost certainly succeeded. Black Ops II’s creators did
nothing to distort or alter Noriega’s image. Indeed, part of their artistic
achievement was to depict his face with utmost realism. Perversely, though,
this artistic achievement constitutes a legal liability. By faithfully rendering
Noriega’s image Activision opened itself up to a right of publicity lawsuit. This
fact alone illustrates why the transformative use test poses such a significant
threat to fundamental First Amendment values.
Under a transformative work test, on the other hand, Noriega’s suit was
hopeless from the start. His character has only a brief role in Black Ops II. His
screen time is limited, and his character has little bearing on the broader work.
Thus, examining Black Ops II as a whole under the transformative work test, the
California Superior Court properly held that Noriega’s suit must fail.75
Nevertheless, the transformative work test cannot always serve as such a
sturdy First Amendment buffer.
To understand why, consider this
hypothetical. Activision develops a new game titled Noriega: A Madman Returns
in which the Noriega character takes a star turn. The game allows viewers to
play the role of an undercover CIA operative infiltrating Noriega’s inner circle
in order to halt his murderous activities. In promotional materials, Activision
explains that the game is intended to serve as a sharply critical condemnation of
See WEST ANN. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (amended 1985).
131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
74 See infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
75 Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., Cal. Super. Trial Order, Los Angeles County, Oct. 27,
2014.
72
73
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Noriega’s appalling misdeeds. By drawing players into Noriega’s web of
madness and allowing them to interact with the psychopaths who inhabit this
horrific, deranged world, the game strips away the veneer of glamour that
sometimes glazes the criminal lifestyle. Instead, players must make a series of
moral decisions and practical sacrifices in order to accomplish their ultimate
mission.
The transformative work test would provide no protection to this
hypothetical game, nor would the transformative use test. If Noriega had
brought a right of publicity suit against the creators of this hypothetical game,
he likely would have won it. The game, after all, uses his unaltered image and
features him as a central character. He would have a strong case under both the
transformative work and the transformative use tests. It would not matter that
A Madman Returns is an expressive work that harnesses the interactive nature of
the video game medium to deepen the artists’ criticism and intensify its impact.
It would not matter that Noriega’s actual grievance is that Activision depicted
him in a harshly negative light. His suit would be, in essence, an intentional
infliction of emotional distress suit in disguise—and he would very likely win it.
This flaw in the transformative work test poses a problem; it is, however, a
fixable one.
IV. THE PROPOSED TEST
Borrowing concepts from intellectual property law and First Amendment
jurisprudence, we propose a new test for courts to perform when faced with a
right of publicity lawsuit.76 Initially, the court should pose two threshold
inquiries. As in First Amendment defamation doctrine, the first of these
inquiries should ask whether the plaintiff is one of two types of public figures:
all-purpose or limited-purpose.77 To qualify as an all-purpose public figure, a
plaintiff must be widely known and discussed78 (e.g., a movie star, a famous
athlete, or a well-known business leader).79 To qualify as a limited-purpose
76 Although this Article specifically examines intentional infliction of emotional distress
lawsuits dressed in the guise of publicity rights, the test we articulate is equally applicable to other
lawsuits. Defamation suits, for example, may be easily dressed in the garb of publicity rights, as
may false light suits.
77 See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (describing these categories for purposes of
determining evidentiary burden placed on defamation plaintiffs).
78 See id. at 351 (noting that some individuals achieve “such pervasive fame or notoriety” that
they become public figures for all purposes and contexts).
79 See Brewer v. Memphis Pub. Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1253–54 (5th Cir. 1980); Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976); James C. Mitchell, The Accidental Purist: Reclaiming the
Gertz All Purpose Public Figure Doctrine in the Age of “Celebrity Journalism,” 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
559, 573–74 (2002).
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public figure, a plaintiff must have thrust herself “to the forefront of particular
public controversies” in order to influence debate.80
If the plaintiff is not an all-purpose public figure or limited-purpose public
figure, the court should simply move on to the transformative work test. If the
plaintiff does qualify as a public figure, however, the court should proceed to
the second threshold inquiry. That threshold inquiry asks whether criticizing,
mocking, or commenting upon the plaintiff is a significant purpose of the
work.81 If not, the court should move on to the transformative work test. If
the work is deemed to have such a purpose, the court should proceed to the
test outlined below.
If the plaintiff is some breed of public figure, and the work can reasonably
be viewed as criticizing or commenting on the plaintiff, the court should then
ask three questions. The first of these asks whether the work presents a false
statement of fact about the defendant made with actual malice—i.e., knowledge
of the statement’s falsity or reckless disregard for whether it was true.82 This
prong explicitly draws from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell,83 in which the Court imported the actual malice standard from
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan84 into tort law in order to forestall disguised
intentional infliction of emotional distress suits.85 In “the world of debate
about public affairs,” speech that is harshly disparaging, even when “motivated
by hatred or ill-will . . . [or] bad motive,” must be granted First Amendment
protection.86 Expression that might be censorable if it targeted private persons

80 These categories are borrowed from Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
Gertz
reaffirmed that the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964), that
the actual malice standard applies to public officials bringing libel suits, Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342–43,
and, as a matter of logic and coherence, public officials should be treated like public figures for
the purposes of the test we propose. As a practical matter, we doubt that the plaintiff’s status as a
public official would prove independently decisive. If a public official were sufficiently known to
have a colorable right of publicity in the first place, then she would presumably qualify as a public
figure as well.
81 This is not to say that the entire work must be devoted to criticizing the defendant. Rather,
this inquiry asks whether the defendant has used the plaintiff’s likeness as a means of criticizing
him. For example, Activision’s use of Noriega’s likeness was extremely limited—but was also
clearly intended to criticize. Thus, Activision’s use would satisfy this inquiry.
82 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (defining actual malice as a
standard that public officials must meet in defamation suits).
83 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
84 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
85 Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56 (ruling that public figures and public officials must show
defendant published false statement of fact with actual malice in order to recover for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
86 Id. at 53; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (overturning verdict for emotional
infliction of emotional distress notwithstanding that defendant’s picketing had “inflict[ed] great
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is shielded by the First Amendment when it pertains to “public debate about
public figures.”87
The second question asks whether a reasonable person would think that the
plaintiff endorsed the work or licensed the use of his image. This prong seeks
to protect plaintiffs who may have a genuine grievance with companies that
have misappropriated their likeness to sell its product. It is critical to note that,
despite its occasional misapplication, the right of publicity is a fundamentally
sound means of protecting an individual’s control over his own likeness. A
recent lawsuit brought by Michael Jordan neatly demonstrates the right’s
continued utility. In 2009, the supermarket chain Dominick’s Finer Foods ran
an advertisement congratulating Jordan on his induction into the Basketball
Hall of Fame and offering a $2 coupon for steak. The ad included the phrase
“Michael Jordan . . . You are a cut above.”88 Dominick’s did not ask Jordan for
permission to use his name, despite the fact that its ad arguably implied that he
had endorsed its steaks.89 Jordan sued, and a Chicago jury awarded him $8.9
million in damages.90 Without state protection of his publicity rights, Jordan
may not have been able to protect his name and identity against such purely
commercial exploitation with de minimis expressive value. Jordan’s suit
illustrates that in evaluating this prong of the test, courts should especially focus
on the use of the plaintiff’s likeness in advertising or promotional materials. If
a video game’s marketing campaign centers around a public figure’s image,
without any clear critical or parodic intent, this prong may be satisfied.
The third question asks whether the defendant’s work is likely to impede the
defendant’s ability to profit from his image. Allowing famous individuals to
profit off their own celebrity is a fundamental underpinning of the right to
publicity.91 This prong does not inquire into whether the defendant’s work was
pain,” id. at 1220, on plaintiff, where pickets “addressed matters of public import on public
property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials,” id.).
87 Id.
88 Arthur Weinstein, Michael Jordan awarded $8.9M in civil suit against supermarket, SPORTING
NEWS, Aug. 21, 2015, available at http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/story/2015-08-21/michaeljordan-awarded-89-million-in-civil-suit-against-chicago-supermarket.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). A
similar right is also a pillar of broader intellectual property law, such as copyright law. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (noting that whether or not an
alleged infringement of copyright impedes the plaintiff’s ability to profit off his own work is a
central prong of fair use analysis). A major difference between the two rights is that copyright
rests more heavily on the rationale of economic incentive. Compare Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of
one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”),
with White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d at 1399 (“The law protects the celebrity’s sole right to exploit
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so effective in criticizing the plaintiff that no one would want to buy a product
that the plaintiff endorses. Rather, this prong asks whether the defendant has
capitalized upon a portion of the market that rightfully belongs to the plaintiff.
For instance, if the defendant produces a video game that allows the character
to assume the role of a famous singer who has not authorized the use of her
likeness, this prong may be satisfied.
An application of this test to the hypothetical Noriega video game described
above illustrates its utility. Noriega is, as a former military dictator and
notorious international criminal, undoubtedly a public figure. Moreover, the
hypothetical video game would obviously be using Noriega’s likeness to criticize
his brutality and avarice. Thus, the two threshold inquiries would be satisfied.
Moving onto the three-prong test, the makers of the hypothetical game
would almost assuredly not be putting forth false statements of fact about
Noriega with actual malice or reckless disregard of the truth. Rather, the
expressive, creative nature of the video game medium would make clear to
players that the game was an imaginative fantasy about what Noriega’s bloody
rule could have looked like—not a fact-based statement of any sort. Further, no
reasonable person would think that Noriega, who pled not guilty to the federal
charges against him,92 licensed his image to the makers of the hypothetical
game. Noriega maintained his innocence throughout his trial and resulting
prison sentence.93 He would surely not authorize his image to be used in a
video game that depicted him as a madman. Finally, the hypothetical game
would probably not capitalize upon a portion of the market that rightfully
belongs to Noriega, since, as previously discussed, Noriega would presumably
never license a video game so deeply critical of him. At a minimum, the burden
would rest heavily on Noriega to demonstrate that such a game undercut his
own efforts to capitalize on his notoriety.
V. VINDICATING FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS
The test we propose may complicate certain right of publicity lawsuits.
However, it would also bring a welcome clarity to cases that seem to pit the
right of publicity against freedom of speech. It is worth explaining briefly why
this clarity is so vital.

this value whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a
combination thereof.”).
92 James LeMoyne, A Thin Paper Trail in Noreiga Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1990, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/10/us/a-thin-paper-trail-in-noriega-inquiry.html.
93 See Noriega Fights His Conviction in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/1996/12/05/us/noriega-fights-his-conviction-in-drug-case.html.
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The Supreme Court has recognized the potential for a clash between
intellectual property and free expression at least since International News Service v.
Associated Press94 nearly a century ago, where the defendant news agency had
reproduced the plaintiff agency’s posted news as the defendant’s own. Recent
Court decisions demonstrate the persistence of this tension.95 With the
profusion of creative expression spurred by proliferating media, this struggle
will doubtless arise with increasing frequency as expressive works borrow and
build upon ideas that originated elsewhere.
Admittedly, courts have sent mixed messages with regard to the importance
of placing First Amendment limitations on intellectual property claims. In
Eldred v. Ashcroft,96 the Supreme Court dismissed, almost out of hand, the
argument that extending copyright terms could cause serious speech-related
harms in violation of the First Amendment.97 And in 2003, the influential
Judge Richard Posner wrote that “[d]isputes over intellectual property . . . are
not profitably conducted in the idiom of the First Amendment. They are the
subject of specialized bodies of law regulating intellectual property.”98
Nevertheless, the right of publicity doubtless implicates at least to some
degree a central principle of the First Amendment. As the Court recently
reaffirmed, “[c]ontent-based laws . . . are presumptively unconstitutional and
may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to
serve compelling state interests.”99 By its own terms, the right of publicity
regulates the content of speech.100 Granted, countervailing considerations
associated with intellectual property support a level of review less stringent than
the strict scrutiny applied when government seeks to suppress the
communicative impact of ideas and information. Still, the need for searching
judicial inquiry to prevent content-based regulations from chilling or punishing
constitutionally protected expression does not disappear altogether when the
interest in reaping gains from one’s fame is involved.
Indeed, some prominent judges have advocated stronger First Amendment
protection against intellectual property claims. Perhaps most notably, Ninth
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 891–92 (2012) (considering whether a treaty removing
certain foreign works from the public domain violates the First Amendment); Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (considering whether an extension of federal copyright protection
unconstitutionally trenches upon free expression).
96 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
97 Id. at 218.
98 McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2003).
99 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citations omitted).
100 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903, 912 n.35
(2003) (“The right of publicity is clearly content-based: It prohibits the unlicensed use of
particular content (people’s names or likenesses).”).
94
95
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Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski has penned two widely discussed opinions in
which he argued for strong First Amendment limitations on both right of
publicity and trademark claims. In one well-known case, Kozinski dissented
from a ruling that allowed Vanna White to sue Samsung for misappropriating
her image after the company made a commercial humorously featuring a Whitelike robot in a blonde wig.101 In Kozinski’s mind, White’s suit dangerously
undermined Samsung’s freedom of expression.
I can’t see how giving White the power to keep others from
evoking her image in the public’s mind can be squared with the
First Amendment. Where does White get this right to control
our thoughts? The majority’s creation goes way beyond the
protection given a trademark or a copyrighted work or a person’s
name or likeness. All those things control one particular way of
expressing an idea, one way of referring to an object or a person.
But not allowing any means of reminding people of someone?
That’s a speech restriction unparalleled in First Amendment
law.102
These concerns should be heightened in the realm of video games, which
are not commercial speech, but pure expression, as the Court affirmed in Brown
v. Entertainment Merchants Association.103 In Brown, the Court dispensed with any
notion that video games might merit lesser First Amendment protection:
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them,
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—
through many familiar literary devices (such as characters,
dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world).
That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.104
The Court’s holding in Brown resonates powerfully in the arena of right of
publicity suits against video game makers. Many of these companies have
produced video games that “communicate ideas” and “messages” to viewers
that fall squarely within the realm of speech most fiercely protected by the
Court’s lawsuit attempted to silence criticism of a dictator and criminal; other

101
102
103
104

White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1519 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
Id. at 2733.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol23/iss1/4

18

Stern and Stern: A New Test to Reconcile the Right of Publicity with Core First Am

2015]

A NEW TEST

111

suits may endeavor to muffle sardonic commentary upon celebrities.105 Either
way, the apparent purpose of these suits—to curtail public discourse by
abridging video game companies’ freedom of expression—contradicts First
Amendment fundamental values.
There may be an initial inclination to dismiss the constitutional importance
of expression like Black Ops II, which combines violent entertainment with
political commentary. As the Supreme Court explained in Brown, however, “it is
difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try”106
when determining the appropriate protection for speech. Moreover, right of
publicity claims by public figures are especially likely to implicate matters of
public importance, since the plaintiff himself is involved in public or political
affairs. Political speech, of course, “is central to the meaning and the purpose
of the First Amendment”107 and lies “at the core of our . . . First Amendment
freedoms.”108 The Constitution affords political expression “unequivocal
protection.”109 Such is its import that political speech must be given “breathing
space”110 to prevent any “chilling effect”111 by threatened litigation. Similarly, as
Chief Justice Warren explained when the Court extended the actual malice
standard to public figure libel plaintiffs, a similar rationale applies to expression
about those individuals as well. Because these figures often wield power and
influence comparable to that of officeholders, application of the actual malice
standard helps to safeguard the public’s right to “be informed on matters of
legitimate interest.”112 The current framework protecting public figures’ right of
105 For example, the actress Lindsay Lohan—who has been mired in legal problems for years as
her acting career has declined precipitously, see Associated Press, Lindsay Lohan’s Court Saga by the
Numbers, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/28/lindsay-lohan-court-saga-num
bers_n_7461614.html (last visited May 28, 2015)—sued Rockstar Games and Take Two
Interactive for including a Lohan-esque character in Grand Theft Auto V. The character, who
appears only briefly but seems to bear some similarities to Lohan, is humorously depicted as a
witless, fame-obsessed fool. See Abigail Elise, Lindsay Lohan “GTA 5” Lawsuit: Actress Adding
Charges Against Rockstar Games For Alleged Character Likeness, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2014),
available at http://www.ibtimes.com/lindsay-lohan-gta-5-lawsuit-actress-adding-charges-against-r
ockstar-games-alleged-1703225. The character’s likeness was also used in some promotional
materials. Id.
106 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
107 Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010).
108 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 32 (1968)).
109 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 58 (1982).
110 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
111 Brown, 456 U.S. at 61.
112 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163–65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); see Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV.
267, 275–78 (explaining how Chief Justice Warren’s opinion proved pivotal on a splintered
Court).
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publicity fails to provide the breathing space needed to preserve robust
commentary on those whose actions and words exert a powerful impact on
society. Its potential to chill political expression and other commentary on
public matters is strong, and must be met by an equally strong First
Amendment counterweight.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Black Ops II, Activision intended to make a critical statement about
Manuel Noriega. Noriega did not appreciate this depiction of him, and so he
did what people who wish to be free from criticism have done for centuries: he
sued. Had Noriega challenged Activision with an intentional inflection of
emotional distress claim, his odds of prevailing would have been negligible.
However, because Noriega filed a right of publicity claim, he stood a real
chance of winning his suit. Indeed, had Noriega filed in the Ninth Circuit
rather than in California state court, he probably would have won.113
The test set forth in this Article is designed to prevent close calls like this
one by creating a clearly delineated framework through which to analyze
potentially censorious right to publicity claims. First, the court should ask
whether the plaintiff is any breed of public figure. If he is not, the court should
proceed with a transformative work test. If he is, the court should ask whether
the expression in question undertakes to criticize or comment upon the
plaintiff. If not, the court should proceed with a transformative work test. If
so, the court should ask three questions. First, does the work present a false
statement made with actual malice? Second, would a reasonable person believe
that the plaintiff endorsed the use of his likeness in this work? Third, might the
defendant’s work impede the plaintiff’s ability to profit from his own image? If
the answer to all these questions is no, the court should reject the lawsuit as an
effort to punish and chill constitutionally protected speech.
Public figures should not be permitted to circumvent the First Amendment
through a loophole in intellectual property law. Noriega may have a limited
right over his own image, but the rest of us have a right to engage critically with
his legacy. That his face appeared in a video game—rather than his name
appearing in a book—should not nullify First Amendment protection.
Expression does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is
accessed through a video game console.

This is because, as previously noted, the Ninth Circuit uses a transformative use test, see
supra note 71 and accompanying text, and Noriega’s actual image was not notably altered.
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